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I

n the last five years, the United States invaded two countries and overthrew
two ruling parties. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the so-called “end of major combat operations” came swiftly and decisively. In their wakes emerged resistances
far more resolute than predicted, forcing coalition military commanders to shift
from a conventional warfare doctrine to one better suited for fighting long wars
against asymmetric enemies with extremist ideologies. But while religious extremism may typify the average insurgent, the biggest threat to American policy
is not posed by the jihadist, who in most cases, lacks the ability to organize, effectively train and recruit forces (other than suicide bombers), and has no
long-term strategy for generating resources, garnering public support, or achieving realistic strategic goals. The real hazard to American objectives in Southwest
Asia comes from armed and active militias who, unlike most insurgents, have
served as career soldiers, seized the support of their populace, and, in many
cases, infiltrated national government institutions.
Though a form of resistance, militiamen are far different in nature
than insurgents or terrorists. In the long-term, militias are most damaging because they weaken government influence by providing unofficial (and effective) security in localized areas using illegal methods. 2 Due to the support
they receive from their constituents and the resultant political power they
wield, militias can only be neutralized through state-sponsored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives. By understanding the similarities and differences between militias and insurgents, noting
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the potential positives and negatives associated with militias, and applying
lessons-learned from DDR-type programs recently employed in Afghanistan
and Iraq, coalition forces can develop an effective counterstrategy for Iraq’s
militias. Such a strategy should be based on political will and international financing as part of a comprehensive approach inculcating political, economic,
and military components.

Militias and Politics in Afghanistan and Iraq
The most prominent militia commander in Afghanistan, and a real
threat to national stability and growth, is Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, former
mujahedin party leader and head of a militia founded in Wahhabism, an extremely conservative brand of Sunni Islam. Now the leader of the Upper House
of Afghan Parliament, Sayyaf has openly refused to dismantle his militia. His
Islamic orthodoxy coupled with his political participation has slowed the modernization of the Afghan judiciary and hindered the expansion of Western style
freedoms in Afghanistan.3 Iraq’s primary militias consist of the Badr Corps (a
paramilitary wing of the politically powerful Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq), the Kurdish Peshmerga (essentially an authorized armed
force supported by a legitimate Kurdish Regional Government), and Muqtada
al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (commonly referred to as the Mahdi Army or Militia). Of these, the Mahdi Militia is widely viewed as most dangerous. As of
May 2006, it is the only militia known to have attacked both coalition and Iraqi
Security Forces, and it was responsible for two major uprisings against coalition and Iraqi forces in 2004.4 Like Sayyaf’s group, Sadr’s Mahdi Militia
claims to be religious based, possesses an extremely conservative and antiWestern ideology, openly enforces an extreme brand of Sharia law, and is now
very politically active—not so much as government leaders, but more as political spoilers, undermining democratic initiatives whenever possible. Like
Sayyaf, Sadr has openly refused to dismantle his militia. In recent months Sadr
claimed to lose control over rogue elements of his organization, making it even
more dangerous than it was two years ago.
Militias and politics are often inextricably linked. During the last
five years, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, violence heightened during the
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run-up to every election. Most analysts attribute these spikes in aggression to
insurgent activity aimed at thwarting democratic reform. In part, those analyses are correct. What is often overlooked, however, is the destructive behavior of militias during these time frames. Political participation by militia
commanders has wreaked havoc in both countries, where militias often flex
their muscles on the margins of political events. In Afghanistan, militia activity rose dramatically just prior to the presidential elections in October 2004
and the parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005. 5 These
forces were more visible than normal because they engaged insurgents who
attacked politically active militia commanders. The militias were also used to
coerce and threaten potential voters. For an example of a militia commander
using muscle to advance his political agenda one need look no further than the
nomination of Ibrahim Jafari as Prime Minister of Iraq in February 2006.
Jafari served as Prime Minister of the Iraqi Transitional Government during
the year prior to February’s nomination. The fact that he was broadly ineffective in advancing government programs and promoting national growth did
not stop him from gaining the initial 2006 nomination. Jafari had the support
of Sadr, whose militia threatened to harm many voting members if Jafari was
not nominated in 2006.

How Militias Compare to Other Forms of Resistance
The insurgency in Iraq is comprised of several components including terrorists, foreign fighters (non-indigenous terrorist-type elements), former regime elements (Saddam loyalists bent on restoring power to the
outlawed Ba’ath Party), and rejectionists (largely Sunni Arabs who have not
embraced the shift from Saddam’s Iraq to a democratically governed state). 6
Militias constitute yet another armed group outside the formal security sector
and central government command.7 Like most insurgents, militiamen view
combat as a personal and honorable calling. Members of both classifications
undergo indoctrination procedures as part of a process meant to instill a sense
of worth and duty. Militiamen, like insurgents, organize, train, and conduct
covert activities outside the rule of law. Both groups are known to have targeted civilians. In extreme cases, like insurgents, certain militias act extrajudiciously via executions and political assassinations, and have been known
to engage in purely criminal activity, including extortion and kidnapping. 8
Both militias and insurgents swear allegiance to non-nationalistic entities,
and both groups obtain resources illegally.
The aforementioned similarities notwithstanding, militias and insurgents are vastly different—especially in Iraq. Because they were originally
formed to safeguard villages, tribes, or sectarian groups, militias are often conSpring 2007

57

“In most cases, militiamen are better trained
than insurgents, often having
served as career soldiers.”

sidered legitimate entities acting morally in the absence of effective national,
provincial, or local security institutions. Insurgent behavior is generally reactionary (in direct response to coalition or national governmental efforts), employed to divide the populace, stunt localized economic growth, and retard
societal advances. Militias, conversely, function to protect neighborhoods and
meet the socio-economic needs of their limited constituency. Generally speaking, militias do not target occupying forces—though they have been known to
target Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq. Militias usually operate as protective details. Because of their popular support, militias do not require elaborate media campaigns, coercion, or the presence of
occupying forces to generate resources. In most cases, militiamen are better
trained than insurgents, often having served as career soldiers. Unlike politically disenfranchised insurgents, militias are more inclined to engage in political processes—especially those within a newly formed national or local
government. Many militias, such as those comprising the Afghan Military
Forces designated during the December 2001 Bonn Conference,9 receive official recognition from the United States and the international community. This
makes militias far more dangerous than insurgents since recognized militias
are able to form political groups, infiltrate national and local legislatures, and
corrupt government security forces. Because most militiamen are not required
to go into hiding, they are afforded opportunities to live as productive members
of society when not engaged in combat. This affords militias better opportunities to create effective command and control structures, providing them the
ability to mobilize far more quickly than most insurgents. Finally, unlike insurgents, who often subscribe to an unsanctioned form of militant Islam, members
of militias have shown more deference to religious leaders and are usually
more apt to adhere to non-extremist Islamic directives issued by respected religious authorities.

Negatives and Positives Associated with Militias
The threats militias pose to national political, economic, and security institutions over extended periods far outweigh any such threats from
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insurgents. Militias in Iraq and Afghanistan have undermined the political
process repeatedly. Although some Iraqi militias and their affiliated political parties support a broad based disarmament initiative in principle, they
are reluctant to proceed because of political rivalries, insurgent attacks, ethnic or sectarian violence, and lack of faith in the ability of national security
forces. Ali Ahmad Jalali, Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January
2003 to September 2005, asserts that while militias do not yet possess the
capacity to pose strategic threats to the government in Afghanistan, they
create a sense of insecurity, hinder economic reconstruction, and weaken
government influence—especially in remote areas. 10 Many Afghan militias
fought alongside coalition forces during initial combat operations against
Taliban insurgents, but the net effects of militias in Afghanistan as well as
Iraq have been overwhelmingly negative. By 2004, American and Afghan
officials considered militia activity more destructive to nation building and
democratic reform than insurgent attacks. In August 2004, the head of international security forces in Kabul commented, “Warlords are a bigger threat
than the terrorists because you can’t build state institutions or enforce rule
of law (as long as militias exist).”11 Three weeks later, President Hamid
Karzai called armed militias a greater threat to democracy than existing
Taliban remnants still active in the region. 12
From an economic perspective, disarmament programs in Afghanistan have yielded limited positive gains using vocational assistance programs
(featuring incentive packages including livestock and agricultural implements, job training, and help in establishing small businesses with partnering
agencies in order to help former militiamen find new professions). 13 However, militiamen are generally reluctant to support state-sponsored economic
growth initiatives by accepting alternative careers because the benefits
(wages, status, and personal gratification) are far outweighed by those provided by their respective militia. An officer in charge of disarmament for Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (ANBP) told reporters in 2003, “We
have commanders who make huge sums of money from what they do” referring to the foreign support they received while fighting the Soviets and later
the Taliban, as well as the money they earn collecting border taxes and providing private security. 14 Another ANBP adviser commented, “Finding jobs
for the mid-level (militia) commanders is hard . . . they’re used to getting
more important jobs—and more money.” 15
From a security standpoint, militias could not be more damaging.
Though they possess a common desire with coalition forces to expel violent
agents of power hoping to restore or establish oppressive regimes, militias
do not support state institutions. Loyalties lie within the militia organization
only. Even worse, militia members often pervade state security mechanisms
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in order to further the militia’s agenda. Rather than providing security for a
national populace, they have little regard for non-militia members. Militias
influence the Iraqi security forces at all levels, making legitimate national
security force units unable or unwilling to confront them. The same holds
true in Afghanistan. As of February 2005, militia commanders were present
in Afghanistan’s national police forces, intelligence units, and National Security Directorate. 16 Commanders employ their militiamen as police, maintain patronage links with sub-commanders, and protect their economic
interests, and some have reportedly used their recruited personnel and access to police vehicles and arms to transport heroin. 17 Initial attempts to
disrupt Afghan militia influence on security yielded positive results, as coalition forces seized huge amounts of heavy weaponry during the first three
years of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Unfortunately, Afghan militia commanders have adapted their tactics. Most no longer see a need for
maintaining stockpiles of heavy weapons since the coalition presence does
not allow for the waging of open warfare. Today these militias maintain
leaner, lightly armed forces more suitable for protecting their political, military, and economic interests. 18 These agile, nimbler forces can more easily
disrupt a sovereign government’s operation and are exponentially more difficult to track and subdue. When they infiltrate government security forces,
as they have in Afghanistan and as has been alleged in Iraq (including the reported Shia militia death squads comprised of forces within the Iraqi government’s Ministry of Interior), militia activity is even more detrimental to
security.
Despite their glaring flaws, militias have sometimes proven beneficial for coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the major combat
phase of OEF, US Special Forces performed targeting missions to facilitate
military offensives by militias against Taliban forces. In fact, most of the
ground combat at the height of fighting (between October and December
2001) was between Taliban units and Afghan opposition militias. 19 In 2003,
the initial security situation was so perilous in Iraq that rather than focus
efforts on dissolving militias, US forces made tactical arrangements with
them. Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, for example, made intelligencesharing deals with five militias, and US forces in Northern Iraq relied solely
upon Kurdish militias to conduct policing and border security operations.20 In
2005, the US military fought alongside the Wolf Brigade and other militia
commando units in counterinsurgency operations in Mosul and Samarra.
Several experts credited the US military with giving assistance to these units
in the form of money, training, and equipment.21 Former Marine officer and
counterinsurgency expert Thomas X. Hammes called this relationship “a
marriage of convenience,” and said that during that period, “US policy was to
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equip those who were the most effective fighters.”22 During a news conference in April 2005, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani announced that the insurgency could be ended immediately if authorities made use of Kurdish, Shia
Muslim and other militias. He made public his intention of accepting offers
by Sunni militia leaders who wanted to be a part of the political process to
allow them responsibility for security in select areas. Talabani also referred
to various militia forces as “popular forces” and believed they could add
value to “government security forces.” 23
In the last year, most parliamentarians have concluded that militias
will never be part of the solution. In July 2006, Mithal al-Alusi, an Iraqi lawmaker, remarked, “We should stop creating militias. We have too many political mafia groups in this country. Enough is enough.” 24 The limited benefits
from fighting in conjunction with militias listed above notwithstanding, coalition forces cannot afford to view militia forces as true partners. Many experts
argue that US dependence on the use of Afghan militia forces in OEF strengthened the militias’ subsequent assertions of independence. 25 Fortunately, leaders of both countries now admonish the presence of militias. President Karzai
has outlawed their presence in Afghanistan. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki has
vowed to disband them, stating that their continued presence in Iraq’s streets
will fuel sectarian violence and pitch the country into an all-out civil war.26
Still, many Afghans and Iraqis who cheered the ousting of the Taliban and
Saddam Hussein’s regime continue to support militias because they create positive and tangible results. As late as July 2006, Iraq’s Mahdi Militia was still attacking British coalition forces in Basra. The negative imagery these attacks
produced was mitigated by the fact that in other areas of Iraq, particularly in
and around Baghdad, the Mahdi Militia was creating checkpoints to secure
safe passage of Shias, enforcing widely accepted social mores, patrolling
neighborhoods, and engaging in social work.27 Certain Iraqi leaders continue to
see the need to utilize militias as an interim solution to quell violence until national security forces are able to provide decisive security. Some experts believe that Iraq’s national party leaders do not have strong beliefs in the
long-term political process, and for this reason, will not push to disband groups
they view as effective at filling immediate security voids.28

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
A Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration plan for Afghanistan was initiated in October 2003. The goal was to demobilize all
Afghan militia forces by the middle of 2005. Publicly supported by Afghan
political leaders and financially resourced by the United Nations, the demobilization phase officially came to an end in July 2005, though the reintegraSpring 2007
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tion process, which consists of helping those who have given up arms rejoin
Afghan society as contributing citizens, continues today. This reintegration
involves a variety of financial packages, education and training, and job
opportunities. 29 The follow-on component to Afghanistan’s DDR program,
begun in June 2005, is the Disbanding Illegal Armed Group program. It targets nearly 2,000 illegal armed groups and seeks the voluntary, negotiated,
and forced disbanding of more than 100,000 members of various groups. 30
DDR initiatives in Afghanistan produced the demobilization of
more than 62,500 factional militiamen and resulted in the collection of over
36,000 small arms and the storing of nearly all the militia’s heavy weapons.31 According to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
(UNAMA), at least 20,000 light weapons and about 8,650 heavy weapons
(tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) were collected by
March 2005. 32 Despite the ostensible successes of DDR in Afghanistan,
Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, commanding general of Combined
Forces Command-Afghanistan, admitted that many challenges remain.
During a May 2006 press conference, he cited uneven security in southern
regions of Afghanistan—not all of which he attributed to remaining Taliban
elements. General Eikenberry went on to report instances of general crime,
narco-trafficking, and tribal fighting. 33 Much of these phenomena are perpetrated by Afghanistan’s remaining militia forces. The long-term success of
Afghanistan’s DDR program is often questioned, as its goal was only aimed
at disarming officially recognized units and collecting heavy weapons. It
did not therefore target unofficial militias that possess illegal and unregistered small weapons.34 An estimated 850 unofficial militias with an excess
of 65,000 members remain outside the scope of this formal DDR process. 35
Further, many militia leaders were reintegrated as political figures, which
now affords them a power base from which to reassemble fighters and institutionalize their roles in the country’s affairs 36 (paradoxically, one original
aim of DDR was to undercut the strength of regional governors relative to
the central government). 37 Political participation by militia leaders also limits the leverage the national government can impose upon unofficial militias
associated with these new statesmen. 38 Despite these circumstances, DDR
efforts in Afghanistan have significantly reduced the effectiveness of militias and at the very least can serve as reference tools for coalition forces as
they design a comprehensive program aimed at eradicating militias in Iraq.
Iraq made its own attempts at DDR one year after the 2003 invasion.
On 5 June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq announced
Order 91, formal legislation that marked the completion of negotiations on the
nationwide transition and reintegration of militias and other armed forces outside of state control.39 This law actually recognized nine different militias,
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linked them to their respective political parties, and provided for the “orderly,
timely, and complete transition and reintegration” of militia forces into national security forces or civilian occupations. There were three significant
problems with this plan, however. First, the directive was created at the hands
of US lawmakers serving in a temporary status. The measure did not receive
buy-in from the three Iraqi governments who have since assumed control of the
country, and therefore quickly lost its teeth. The ban was never enforced as an
Iraqi law—even though all militias except the Mahdi Militia agreed to the
ban.40 Second, the directive was not resourced appropriately since millions of
dollars earmarked for militia demobilization and reintegration were actually
used to address unplanned-for security threats. Third, and partly a function of
the second problem, many Iraqi leaders soon saw a need for militias to fill security gaps left by the nascent Iraqi police and army. According to Kenneth
Katzman, senior Middle East analyst for the Congressional Research Service,
many Iraqi lawmakers believed that the existence of militias was necessary because they were willing to use brutal methods to “get tough” on insurgents in
ways that national security forces either would not (because they lacked the
will) or could not (because of newly formed Iraqi civil rights laws). 41
Several additional strategic miscues hindered DDR-related attempts
in Iraq. Initially, a formal DDR process was not considered necessary because
Iraqi armed forces had self-demobilized. When the CPA did begin a DDRtype process to address threats posed by illegally armed groups, it did so far
too late, had too limited a staff and budget, and according to a 2005 RAND
study, lacked support from the interim government and coalition nations. 42
This original CPA attempt at outlawing militias lacked political will on the
part of Iraqi lawmakers as well as incentives required for program success. In
April 2004, a Badr Corps member and Shia politician reviewed Order 91 and
remarked, “We’d consider standing down for the right reasons, but nothing
has been put on the table by the CPA to convince us we should do this.” 43 After
the Iraqis assumed full control of government, a primary security ministry,
the Ministry of Interior, was allowed to fall into the hands of the Badr Corps. 44
Though this private army has since renounced its militia title and now operates under the auspices of a civic group called the Badr Organization, common perception was that Bayan Jabr, former Badr Corps leader and Minister
of Interior in 2005, was allowing Badr Corps ideology—if not its leaders
directly—to play a strong role in directing the actions of Iraqi police. 45 Many
Shia militia members have been allowed to place members into army and
police units as a way to serve political interests and gain influence for associated lawmakers. This phenomenon is especially evident in the Shiadominated south, where militia members have hindered the implementation
of objective law enforcement.46
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US military leaders once regarded Iraqi militias as a secondary concern. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May
2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that the American government had accepted the continued existence of militias, provided
they remained friendly to the United States. 47 As previously mentioned, many
officials even found militias to be useful ad hoc fighting forces to counter insurgents. Since June 2004, leadership, coordination, and resourcing for DDR
are all lacking, and any DDR efforts that targeted militias have effectively
ceased.48 US officials now realize that militias actually pose significant
long-term detriments to Iraq’s growth as a democratic and transparent nation.
On 7 March 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter
Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a press conference that addressed militias in Iraq. The associated media guidance noted that Iraq’s government must “get control of its militias.” 49

A DDR Plan Tailored for Iraq
Polling results now suggest that despite the substantial amount of
grass-roots support provided to militias during 2004 and 2005, the majority of
Iraqi citizens no longer desire their presence, seeing them as a liability and a
source of instability. Data compiled by the International Republican Institute
during March 2006 indicate that most Iraqis believe that militias make Iraq a
more dangerous place and should be disbanded. In Northern Arab and Sunni
provinces over 90 percent of Iraqis polled support complete abolishment and
even in Baghdad, where militias have thrived, 65 percent of Iraqis feel that
armed militias make Iraq a more dangerous place to live.50 As Major General
William Caldwell, spokesman for the Multi-National Force in Iraq, noted in a
27 June 2006 press conference, the Iraqi government must tackle illegal armed
groups on three levels: political, economic, and security.51
Political will is the single most important aspect of a successful
DDR plan targeting militias. A 2005 RAND study noted that multiple militias
in Iraq have continued to operate as autonomous, non-state armed forces
since 2004.52 A May 2006 report to Congress by the Department of Defense
noted that most of Iraq’s militias continue to operate openly and with popular
support, and are likely to remain active in areas where national institutions
and forces are not yet adequate to meet social and public safety needs of the
population.53 Without a strong and clear message from the national government, militia activity will continue. Progress was slow during the first 12
months of the DDR program in Afghanistan, partly due to the perception that
President Karzai was slow in mustering political will in support of associated
DDR initiatives.54 Fortunately, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has dog64
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gedly striven to lay the groundwork for DDR. In June 2006, he announced a
24-point national reconciliation plan, which hints that some form of amnesty
will be offered for insurgents and militias alike who lay down their arms willingly and agree to become law-abiding citizens of Iraq. The reconciliation
plan is important because in addition to extending an olive branch to those
who truly wish to see Iraq succeed, it establishes the Iraqi government’s
position relative to militias. Just after Maliki’s announcement, Lieutenant
General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq, called the reconciliation plan the precursor to a willingness on the part of militias to disband, noting that “until militias are
convinced that a legitimate government is working on their behalf, there’s
very little incentive for them to disband and demobilize.” 55 General Dempsey
further remarked that the national reconciliation initiative has to gain traction
before any move is made against militias, noting that “the last thing you want
to do is confront them (militias) without any policy with which to deal with
them. . . .” 56 During an interview with Western and Iraqi journalists shortly
after he announced his initiative, Prime Minister Maliki stated, “Many people
contacted me on the day I announced the reconciliation plan, and there is a lot
of support even from militias.” 57 The International Crisis Group (ICG) recommends that Maliki’s government plainly articulate the benefits of DDR to
the populace before the program begins, clearly define illegally armed
groups, and publicly outline punitive actions for DDR violators.
From an economic standpoint, reconstruction efforts by coalition
countries must continue in order to convince groups currently served by militias that the national government can, in fact, provide the basic economic necessities required for an acceptable level of prosperity. In 2005, after four
years of war, nearly 90 percent of Afghanistan’s budget was still externally
funded.58 Iraq must hope for similar long-term assistance from the international community. A strong government can effectively court donors through
international conferences, but foreign funding must be allocated properly for
alternative livelihood programs in Iraq as well as basic necessities. Demobilized soldiers in Afghanistan received a voucher entitling them to individualized career counseling, an interim job if necessary, and one of several
assistance packages.59 According to the UNAMA, most of the 43,700 militia
fighters disarmed by March 2005 have begun to exercise their reintegration
options for job training and small business establishment.60 Until now, the
only tangible progress made in Iraq toward coaxing non-state professional
fighters away from illegally armed groups was a short-lived stipend program
for former Iraqi soldiers enacted by the CPA in 2003. 61 According to the 2005
RAND study, to adequately resource future DDR programs in Iraq, the international community must support the effort with a dedicated donor assistance
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committee charged with providing policy and fiscal support to an Iraqi-led effort to disband militias. 62 The ICG further recommends ensuring transparency and accountability in disbursement of community development aid and
ensuring that funding and planning for reconstruction projects precede DDR
efforts.63
Security is the third pillar of an effective DDR plan. Militias are sustained through localized support from citizens who believe popular forces
constitute more effective security elements than national security forces.
Alexandre Schmidt, crime prevention expert of the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime, asserts that judicial systems and law enforcement need to be strong
outside of capital cities before outlying militias can be effectively disbanded.64 A study conducted by the ICG on militia disarmament in Afghanistan cites three essential elements for an effective DDR plan. They include
the mapping of official and unofficial militia networks to be disarmed,
removing key nodes in these networks from security posts, and imposing
criminal penalties on those who refuse to disarm their official militias or who
maintain unofficial militias.65 These objectives, already being pursued in
Iraq, should comprise the security framework for DDR efforts against militias in Iraq.
All three facets of the DDR plan described above must be implemented simultaneously. Announcing a plan without teeth will only make the
Iraqi government appear confused and unorganized; programming economic
incentives for disarmament and outlining alternative training for militiamen
is worthless without the necessary funding to enact such programs; disarming
militiamen is futile if there is nowhere to place them. In addition, the plan is
both top-down and bottom-up, meaning that militia leaders as well as their
followers should be targeted. According to General Dempsey, an effective
DDR plan is “something that has to happen from both ends—the top, (by) political mandate, (and the bottom), with enforcement.” 66

Components for a Successful DDR Plan in Iraq
Repeated Emphasis on Reconciliation by Iraqi Leaders
Reconciliation must not be confused with a complete pardon. This
political settlement must be fully articulated and fully endorsed by all members of the Iraqi government. The initiative, now simply an idea, must be
voted into a law that clearly defines authorized armed forces. An explicit set
of criteria must be formalized to determine exactly who can be pardoned outright, who can be pardoned conditionally based on their progress during reintegration, and who must be tried in Iraqi courts based on past actions against
Iraqi security units, coalition forces, other illegal groups, and civilians. Many
66
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military experts argue in favor of an incremental approach to militia disarmament, 67 where militiamen gradually realize the benefits of disavowing
allegiance to an illegal group through positive interaction with nationally recognized forces. Rising sectarian tensions in Iraq, however, do not afford Iraqi
lawmakers such a luxury. With a law, no gray area will exist for militias. Formal legislation will preclude any of the present confusion in distinctions between terrorist groups, militias, and insurgents. It must be fully endorsed by
the international community, and the United Nations should acknowledge its
accordance with the laws outlined in its charter.
Drawing a Line in the Sand
When appropriate, preferably within the next three months, a ceasefire of sorts must be announced. The Iraqi government, en masse, must declare a firm date for all militia activity to cease. Many will challenge this rule,
and they must be dealt with swiftly and decisively. This measure will require
a large amount of political will, as many Iraqi politicians still possess constituencies comprised of or significantly supported by militias. The fact that
many militias in Iraq possess political power is significant. On 28 August
2006 a military adviser serving in Iraq told reporters, “Until the government
comes out and says, ‘Disarm the militias,’ it’s a very ambiguous situation. If
there was an announcement by the government, there would be no more ambiguity.”68 It is also vital that Iraq’s political leadership hold its ground over
time. The former commanding general of international security forces in
Kabul, Afghanistan, remarked that in order to be successful, “You have to
create in the (militia leaders’) minds that DDR is irreversible, that (they) are
gone.”69 Prime Minister Maliki has already begun waving a carrot in front of
militia leaders, but his promises of a stable Iraq will only come to fruition if he
carries a stick with which to enforce his decrees. In Afghanistan, the absence
of a deterrent force that could ensure compliance with the DDR process
remains a critical shortcoming.70 Maliki must ensure he wields the proper
balance of punitive action as well as incentives to coax militiamen into
disarmament.
Permit Militia Fighters to Join Iraq’s Security Forces (Demobilizing)
During a news conference in May 2004, the commander of an American division battling the Mahdi Army said he would entertain the idea of assimilating militia members into a force he could fight alongside. He noted, “If
the militia dissolved tomorrow . . . I’ve got 600 unemployed young men on
my hands . . . some of them are probably decent young men who have been
badly led astray.”71 Three years ago, creating security forces comprised of
non-militia members who have never raised weapons against coalition or
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Iraqi government forces might have been a plausible idea. Today a more pragmatic approach is required to bolster existing national security forces and
eradicate ad hoc security groups. Violence and bloodshed have pervaded
Iraqi society to such an extent that very few “wholly innocent” young men are
currently available for such work. Handling a weapon is what many militiamen do best; trained properly, and operating with an allegiance to the national
government, they might provide protective services in a legal fashion. As reporter David Gompert warns, however, these men should not be permitted to
join Iraqi security forces as groups (with their command chains intact), but
rather as individuals, meaning that the security ministries must be taken out
of the hands of parties and politicians who want their militias to dominate the
security forces.72
Emphasis on Alternative Occupations (Reintegration)
On 19 May 2006, during a conference with the Pentagon press
corps, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli noted that disillusionment, poverty, and hopelessness are the breeding grounds for violence. 73 Once militia
members disarm and disavow allegiance to an illegally armed group, a
comprehensive program must be in place to show these individuals, through
education, training, and job offers, alternative opportunities for productive
livelihoods within Iraqi society. In July, a senior Sadr aide, Sheik Abdul
Zahra al-Suwaidi, remarked that he looked forward to the day when Iraqi
forces become strong enough to handle national security. Then, he noted,
“we will be happy to see the Mahdi Army merged into the military and security forces.” 74
Unannounced and Unscheduled Sweeps by Iraqi Forces (Disarming)
Many experts have written about the need to offer continuous
warnings to illegal armed groups residing within Iraqi communities. In fact,
the ICG recommends that “communities must have prior knowledge of any
military action to disarm militias in populated areas.” 75 The reason for this
concern is obvious. Forewarning should, in theory, mitigate not only loss of
innocent life but also loss of popular support for coalition and Iraqi security
forces. But given warnings, militias and insurgents alike will simply vacate
the premises prior to the sweep, reconstituting after the sweep is complete.
The operational failures resulting from ineffective sweeps would outweigh
non-combatant losses or declines in popular support during professionally
executed raids. Prime Minister Maliki’s policy statements should be the
only “warnings” provided. This will not only keep Iraqi forces one step
ahead of militias, but will also create a sense of responsibility within a given
community to eradicate illegal groups dwelling in their midst, knowing
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these groups will only bring bloodshed. As noted previously, polls suggest
the vast majority of Iraqis already find militias to be disruptive and dangerous. Unannounced sweeps by Iraqi forces will help sway the opinion of
those who are not yet convinced.
Clarify the Multi-faceted Mission for Coalition Soldiers
The idea of winning hearts and minds in Iraq is not a new one. In the
last four years soldiers have courageously battled insurgents daily. But the
fight against militias adds yet another dimension to the role of coalition
forces. Until now, coalition soldiers have been forced to exercise discretion
when dealing with the masses in order to properly represent democratic ideals. They have been tasked with modifying that mindset—often times at a moment’s notice—in order to swiftly defeat insurgents who would do them
harm. Now, in addition, they must judiciously battle militiamen in an attempt
to both disarm and reintegrate them. That objective requires a clear understanding of this mission and is only possible with further cultural awareness
training and greater emphasis on the proper execution of military actions supporting the limited and evolving objectives of a DDR program. In addition to
this new aspect of responsibility, coalition forces must continue to train and
equip Iraqi security forces so they can guarantee the safety of Iraqi citizens.
The current commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, which oversees coalition security advisers in Iraq, states that in order to weaken militias in the long
term, “People have got to be convinced the Iraqi security forces will be able to
protect them.”76
The resistance in Iraq now involves sectarian strife in addition to insurgent attacks on coalition forces. Militias are, in large part, responsible for
this change in the combat landscape, and their activity has been on the rise. A
30 August 2006 article in The Washington Post cited rampant assassinations
of Sunni medical patients by Shia militias targeting hospitals in Baghdad.77 In
the article, a Sunni states, “We would prefer now to die instead of going to the
hospitals” which he described as “killing fields.” Coalition forces have taken
on militia groups before. In 2004, coalition forces battled Mahdi Militia
forces during at least two highly publicized uprisings. At that time, the foundations for effective DDR were not in place, and though the militia activity
was put down, the coalition victories were only tactical successes. With a
full-scale DDR program in place, militias can be targeted with the intent of
making operational and strategic-level gains. On 31 August 2006 Sadr officials reported that the Mahdi Army had once again clashed with coalition
forces in eastern Baghdad.78 Though a US military spokeswoman would not
confirm this report, if true, it could mark the beginning of a focused effort to
finally eradicate Iraq’s militias. Now is the time to deal with militias. Iraqi
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leaders appear to have the necessary political will, support from the international community is solid, and Iraqi and coalition military forces are poised
for a decisive, tide-turning campaign. During what many hope is the last
phase of substantive foreign occupation in Iraq, all illegally armed groups
must be dealt with in the proper fashion in order to achieve a lasting peace.
Full-scale implementation of the DDR initiatives outlined above can effect
such peace.
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